Chapter Three

 

Another Account of the Battle of Okeechobee

25 December 1837

By Allen C. Altvater

 

          One of the greater thrills in the life of the amateur interested in history, is the opportunity to talk to an “old-timer” or an area pioneer about his early experiences.  The expressed memories are often radically different from documented history of the period or from impressions handed down from one generation to another.  It is a commonly accepted fact that, for some people, as they advance in age, the recollections of their youth become clearer even though they may have difficulty in remembering what happened yesterday.  It is tragic that most of the stories told by the pioneers of Florida have been lost by the passing of those who told them.

 

                It was my good fortune, in 1916, to work for “Uncle Billy” Varn who was, at that time, well past “middle age.”  But his memory was keen and, as we rode around Central Florida in his model T Ford, he related many experiences of his youth and also tales passed on to him by relatives who had come to Central Florida in the 1840’s and before.  These relatives had been the real pioneers, some had fought in the Indian wars.  Their progeny are now leaders in their communities.

 

                It is not surprising that a boy, still in his teens, would listen breathlessly while Uncle Billy (#) told stories of the Seminole Indian Wars as related to him by his relatives who had been engaged in them.  Billy painted an especially graphic picture of the engagement near Okeechobee on Christmas day 1837 when, he said, the Indians lured the U.S. troops under Col. Taylor, into an ambush and had “mowed them down,” administering such a stunning defeat that Col. Taylor spent several days gathering his casualties and carrying them back as he “retreated up the Kissimmee River.”

 

                Remembering these stories, quite some confusion was generated later when I read Col. Taylor’s official report of the battle and also when I read the inscription on the monument near the battle site which reads, in part, “In these woods on Christmas day, 1837, was fought the battle of Okeechobee in which a large band of Seminole Indians, under Chiefs Wildcat, Alligator and Sam Jones, was routed by - - .”

 

                Which is the true picture of the outcome of this engagement?  Were the Indians “routed” by the troops or were the troops “defeated” by the Indians?

            In his official report, (*) Col. Taylor remarked “ - - and the enemy driven in all directions.”  Before this and before the account of the battle, he wrote, “Here another young Indian was captured. He pointed to a dense hammock on our right, about a mile distant in which he said the hostiles were situated and waiting to give us battle.”

 

                Indeed, the Indians were waiting and prepared.  They were in a hammock, behind trees and logs, facing a sawgrass marsh through which the troops must wade in knee-deep mud and water.  The Indians had cut the grass on their side of the march so that when the troops emerged, they were in full view of their enemies.  Some excerpts from Col. Taylor’s report will give a quick view of the initial engagement which involved 1,100 U.S. troops and about 300 Indians.

 

                “Moving in the direction of the hammock, after proceeding about a quarter of a mile, we reached the swamp which separated us from the enemy, three quarters of a mile in breadth, being totally impassible for horses and nearly so for foot, covered with a growth of saw-grass, five feet high and about knee deep in mud and water, which extended to the right as far as the eye could reach, and to the left to a part of the swamp and hammock we had just crossed, through which ran a deep creek. - - -

 

                “On reaching the borders of the hammock the Volunteers and spies received a heavy fire from the enemy, which was returned by them for a short time, when the gallant commander, Colonel Gentry, fell mortally wounded.  They mostly broke - - nor could they be again brought into action - - - .

 

                “ - - until their gallant commander, Lieut. Colonel Thompson, and his adjutant, Lieut. Center were killed and every officer with one exception, as well as most of the noncommissioned officers, including the sergeant major and four of the orderly sergeants, killed and wounded of those companies, when that portion of the regiment retired a short distance and were again formed, one of their companies having but four men left untouched. - - -

 

                “The action was a severe one and continued from half past twelve until after 3 p.m., a part of time very close and severe.  We suffered much, having 26 killed and 112 wounded, among whom are some of our most valuable officers.  The hostiles probably suffered, all things considered equally with ourselves, they having left 10 dead on the ground besides doubtless, carrying off many as is customary with them when practicable.”

 

                Park DeVane has indicated that there are strong reasons to believe that Col. Taylor’s forces were lured into a dangerous position, and that, far from defeating the Indian enemies, the troops under Col. Taylor came off second best.

 

            Mr. DeVane has made studies in depth, of the several Seminole Indian Wars, the causes, the sites, the treaties, the Indian strategies and even the thinking and reasoning of the Seminoles as applied to their military operations.  He notes that there are certain salient characteristics in their battle tactics that can be traced through all the campaigns.

 

1)   Since the numbers of Indian fighters were severely limited as compared to the greater numbers of Federal troops, it was necessary for the Seminoles to choose the battlegrounds most advantageous to them.  It was their custom to use the element of surprise to the greatest degree possible; inflict as much damage as they could on the first onslaught and then withdraw by scattering and just disappearing.  (In addition to the battle of Okeechobee, it will be noted that these tactics were used at the battle of Withlacoochie and Dade Massacre.)

 

2)   They did their damage from behind trees or logs or other protections - not in organized ranks.  After firing, they dropped to the ground and rolled to one side, then reloaded their muzzle loaders while in a prone and protected position.

 

                Park DeVane is intimately acquainted with every square foot of the area covered by Col. Taylor in his march toward the Okeechobee battle ground; the area where he camped the night before the engagement; the route taken by the troops and the movements of the Indians.  He can even point out the trees into which the soldiers fired their slugs when they replaced the charges before going into battle to insure that the powder was fresh.

 

                There are several salient points in the accounts of events leading to the Okeechobee engagement, all of which must be considered to prove or disprove the theory that Col. Zackary Taylor had been hoodwinked by the Indians at Okeechobee.  First in the sequence of events was the fact that several days before Christmas, while the troops were between Ft. Gardner and Ft. Bassinger, several Indians had allowed themselves to be captured and interrogated.  The information they gave whetted the fighting appetites of Col. Taylor and his men.

 

                On Christmas morning, two more were captured and they volunteered directions to the hammock and Col. Taylor followed those directions, disregarding the suggestions by Col. Gentry that the approach to the hammock that concealed the enemy be made by a circuitous route on high, dry land.  Taylor laid a course pointed out by the Indians that led through a practically impassable swamp.  Upon emerging from the swamp, he found that the Indians had spent much time and effort in preparing the site by cutting down the vegetation, leaving the troops without any shelter from the deadly fire of the Indians from the safety of the trees in the hammock.

 

                The fighting lasted several hours and the initial official report listed 26 soldiers killed and 112 wounded.  Others died later from wounds received.  The same report noted that 10 Indians were killed.  Here, there is some incongruity in the report made by Col. Taylor.  In one place he stated “ - - The hostiles probably suffered, all things considered, equally with ourselves, they having left 10 dead on the ground besides, doubtless, carrying off many more as is customary when practicable.”  In another statement he noted “ - - and the enemy driven in all directions.”  Their fight was either well organized or they didn’t remove very many casualties.

 

                The entire series of events seems to follow the pattern described by Park DeVane.  The Indians had prepared a position chosen by them at Lake Okeechobee.  They employed a series of decoys who directed the troops into the position that was favorable to the Indians and perilous to the Federal troops.  They inflicted damage so long as they had the advantage and then melted away into the woods or, as Taylor described it, “in all directions.”  They were not pursued further by Col. Taylor and his command who buried their dead and transported their wounded back to Ft. Bassinger.  Col. Taylor soon continued on to Ft. Brooke (Tampa).

 

                I am inclined to agree with the impressions of Park DeVane and “Uncle Billy” Varn.

 

(This article is reprinted from Bulletin Number Thirty Four.

Sebring Historical Society, October 1981. Pages 983-986.)

 

 

 

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